In most post-industrial countries injury is a leading cause of death, particularly premature death. In Australia, for example, over two thirds of all deaths among persons aged 15 to 24 years are the result of injury. Transport, particularly road transport, is the single most frequent setting for fatal injury. Despite these facts injury research is under-funded and uncoordinated. There is only a fledgling science and little underpinning theory. There is a plethora of unlinked data sets, each reflecting the institutional responsibility of the collecting agency. Even within transport there is little cross modal contact. While the complexities of service delivery demand institutional segregation no such case exits for the segregation of research.
INTRODUCTION
This paper begins with an examination of how injury, no matter what the cause, compares with other population-level health problems. As part of this examination, road traffic injury is placed among all causes of injury as well as within its wider transportation context.
Then the social and political factors influencing injury prevention are compared and contrasted for the three main categories of injury setting -transport, occupational and "other". While cogent arguments exist for the separation of intervention program management, no such case can be made for the separation of research and concomitant theory development. The resultant loss of effectiveness is illustrated.
The paper moves on to explore the key dimensions of injury prevention research and to highlight critical needs.
The reader is asked to bear in mind, throughout, that the situation described is that which applies in Australia and is cautioned against uncritical generalisation to other countries.
THE PLACE OF INJURY AMONG POPULATION-LEVEL HEALTH PROBLEMS
The most common measure of the magnitude of a public health problem is death -the absolute number of deaths, the risk measure of deaths per 100,000 population and the age/frequency interaction measure of years of potential life lost. On each count, the main "killers" in developed society are heart disease and cancer. However, these macro-measures are misleading as both these "killers" strike disproportionately among older people.
As an aside, the other historically major public health problem -infectious disease -was under control in most fully industrialised countries by the late 1950s, although HIV-AIDS has seen a rise in population-based risk rates in the last decade or so. Nevertheless, infectious disease still ranks well below injury 1 .
Injury is the most common form of death among people aged between one and 44 years, accounting for almost half of all deaths in this total age group and over 70 per cent of all deaths among those aged between 15 and 24 years. Moreover, injury is the single largest cause of years of potential life lost to the age of 75 years (average of 32 years lost) and is more than twice heart disease (average of five years) and cancer (average nine years) combined 2 . Injury strikes primarily at people in the prime of their life.
Of at least equal importance is the burden injury places upon the acute health care system. For every injury-caused death, there are forty hospital admissions, 350 emergency department treatments and over 1,300 general practitioner treatments 3 . The potential societal benefits of effective prevention of injury are immense.
While in no way detracting from the sanctity of life at any age it is disturbing to note that for every $1 spent on injury research $5 are spent on heart research and $10 on cancer research. There are many "heart foundations" and "cancer societies" devoted to promoting the causes of prevention and research but no equivalent in the injury field. Given the objective data on prevalence and significance to a population's well being one must ask why this considerable imbalance exists.
There seem to be two major explanations: a) There is no single professional or socio-political constituency. Heart disease and cancer are the province of the medical profession, injury has no single home. The transport sector is responsible for injury arising from transport, the industrial relations sector for injury in the work-place and a plethora of others for injury during sport/recreation, at school or in the home. Such institutional diversity prevents government viewing injury as a single public health issue 4 . b) The community views heart disease and cancer as ailments which can strike anyone with no blame attached whereas injury tends to be viewed as the result of careless, if not negligent, behaviour by people who "ought to know better". An attitude of blameworthiness makes it difficult to generate broad community support for expenditure on research and prevention 5 .
Whatever the explanation, there can be no doubt that injury, despite the objective evidence of its importance to population well-being, fares poorly 1 . It is: -significantly under-funded relative to heart disease and cancer; -not regarded as a mainstream area in which professionals can make a significant career; -lacks integrated data-bases and a scientific tradition through which its case may be developed.
THE MAJOR (MACRO) CAUSES OF INJURY
Suicide and road crashes are the two most common causes of death by injury, accounting for just over 60 per cent of the total ( Table 1) .
The inclusion of suicide in the epidemiology of injury underscores the need to treat "intention" as simply one of the variables to be studied and reinforces the attempt by the British Medical Journal to ban the use of the term accident * from the professional literature on injury 5 . Suicide is the most common form of injury death and intentional, self-inflicted injury the third most common form of injury hospitalisation. Intentional injury must be studied as part of the field of injury prevention research 6 . When non-fatal injury, severe enough to require hospitalisation is examined, falls are revealed as the most common cause, exceeding road crashes by a factor of at least three (Table 2 ). It should be noted, of course, that the data are frequencies and population risk rates aggregated across all levels of severity of injury. A different picture may emerge if we were reliably able to compare injury severity levels. Hospital bed days or some measure of residual disability would be useful measures but are not readily available in comparable form across the different injury settings. It is rare to see data such as the above presented in a journal devoted to transportation, and more particularly road traffic, safety because of the institutional separation * The Monash University Accident Research Centre was formed before the question of intent in injury causation was debated. The issue of a name change is under active discussion.
of policy making and intervention program management according to the environmental settings in which injury occurs. One result of this separation, which has already been pointed out, is the lack of a cohesive voice and the resultant underfunding that typifies the field of injury research and prevention. A second result is professional fragmentation and the resultant missed opportunities to capture potential synergies and to develop a coherent theoretical framework. These missed opportunities are best illustrated by example, drawing on the experiences of the Monash University Accident Research Centre (MUARC). Let us begin with a closer look at injury by mode of transportation. In Australia, injury prevention responsibility is also separated institutionally by mode -road, rail-based public transport, air and marine and the overlaps at the intermodal interfaces receive little research attention (see Figure 1) .
As a result there are incompatible data bases that make cross-model investigation extremely difficult. In rail, the most frequent injuries are suicide, falls and intentional injury caused during assaults on trains and at stations. Table 3 illustrates the impact the exclusion of suicide has on the apparent safety records of the different surface transport modes. 1. Crashes at road-rail intersections 2. Crashes at portside road areas 3. Crashes at portside rail areas 4. Crashes at portside road-rail intersections 5. Crashes on airport standing areas, taxiways and runways 6. Vehicles as workplaces. Crashes in warehouses/distribution centres. Effects of suicide on professional drivers. Long term effects of injury.
Fig. 1 The intermodal 'interfaces'
Suicide by leaping in front of a moving train is the fourth most common means of suicide. For rail managers, the management of the effects on drivers and passengers is a vexing issue. MUARC is presently studying rail suicides in an endeavour to find ways of minimising suicide on rail tracks. Measuring injury by assault on public transport is almost impossible. Each rail operator maintains some record of reported events, but under-reporting is common. The hospital records (described in more detail later) are frequently not coded in sufficient detail. The road traffic equivalent is the phenomenon now known as "road rage" wherin one motorist intentionally injures another as the result of a conflict related to a traffic event. This is an excellent example of the effects of institutional fragmentation -the road traffic authority is not concerned with either suicide or road rage, ensures neither appears in the road injury statistics and takes no preventive action as it sees such events as outside its area of accountability.
Similarly, injury related to bicycle and motorcycle use is under-reported to a significant degree. A child who falls from his bicycle on a footpath or an off-road track is not recorded in the road injury database, a child who falls from his bicycle within the road reserve sometimes is and a child cyclist struck by a motor vehicle almost always is. There is so much we could learn about specific types of fall injury and about the effectiveness of measures such as helmets, if the data base were more comprehensive but the road traffic authority does not accept responsibility for events outside its legally defined road reserve. But where does transport stop and recreation start?
There are myriad other cases where vehicles and traffic interact and where integrated research into causes -of both events and injury outcomes -could be beneficial. For example, injuries to pedestrians caused by a collision with a fork-lift vehicle are a significant problem in industrial settings, particularly storage and distribution centres 8 . Rarely, however, do traffic engineers ply their trade to create a safer traffic flow environment! MUARC is in the late stages of a study, the outcome of which will be guidelines for the design and operation of environments in which fork-lifts operate.
A further example is the case of injuries to farm workers in events involving tractors. The preponderance of deaths involved tractor rollover, typically on uneven or sloping terrain. The design, and retrofitting under government subsidy, of rollover protection systems to reduce death and serious injury was highly successful 9 (see Figure 2) . Borrowing from the crash-worthiness work with road vehicles MUARC is now developing a tractor safety rating system to enable farmers to make informed purchases with safety as one of the selection criteria. 
THE DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONVENIENCE SHOULD NOT EXTEND TO RESEARCH
There is much to commend the assignment of responsibility for injury prevention to the institution which controls the environment in which injury occurs. Transportation, for example, exists to move goods and people and is of great benefit in both economic and social development. The growth in personal mobility has enabled mankind to grow in so many ways. But there are several downsides (or unintended byproducts), each of which needs to be managed, and only one of these is injury to transport users. The transportation authority is therefore the right manager. Whether it is the optimum setting for injury research is another matter.
It is instructive to reflect on the stages of the evolution of traffic safety as a science 10 . The transportation sector is dominated by engineers whose initial primary concerns were with the technologies of the vehicles and their infrastructures and later with the development of systems to facilitate their efficient interaction. It was not until pioneers like Haddon brought to transportation the public health concepts of host-agent-environment, and adapted the "pre", "during" and "post" event model to road crashes, that a broad ranging scientific approach truly began 11 .
The rapid growth of traffic safety science, together with the government's commitment to prevention driven by the community's concern with a road toll fuelled by rapid motorisation, has brought spectacular results. As Figure 3 dramatically illustrates, the population based risk of death from a traffic crash has now fallen to a point where it is third of the four injury-based causes of death shown. In the same 20 years period the risk of death from other forms of injury has not fallen, indeed that for suicide has risen.
It is a matter of considerable irony that the science of road injury prevention should now be so much better developed than in any other area of injury. Injuries among children, injuries to the elderly, injuries at home, injuries during recreation, and so on, have each remained within the province of the public health authorities, where they have (largely) languished, at least in terms of support for research and prevention. In the occupational arena the administrative need for compensation and the pervading attempts to allocate blame to employers continues to dominate. The absence of a prevention philosophy creates data sets that make scientific study very difficult 12 .
However, a focus on compensation need not constrain prevention. In Victoria, the Transport Accidents Commission (TAC) is the government's no-fault compensation insurer for transport injury. It invests heavily in both research and prevention and has found both to be very cost-effective in reducing future liabilities 13 . It would seem that, in Victoria at least, the occupational safety scene is constrained by the lack of a belief in the value of prevention.
Given the entrenched institutional positions, and the complex socio-political processes by which public policies get set, it is unlikely that the disparate accountabilities for injury control will be integrated in the near term. Moreover, it is by no means certain that they should be, given that injury is a by-product of a wide range of disparate systems -transport, sport, industry etc. -and each may best be managed within its parent system.
What must change, however, is the way injury research is managed. Traffic injury, child injury, sports injury should be no more separated than the fields of cancer speciality such as breast cancer, bowel cancer, leukemia and so on. There should be a core, shared science and theoretical underpinning where cross-application synergies are sought and welcomed and the lessons from one field rapidly learned by the others. That is far from the case at present.
There are at least three streams -of literature, of professional training and career development, of methods and of data bases -one for road traffic safety, one for occupational safety and one for those injury settings that come within the purview of the public health agencies. These disparate streams have evolved, in large part, as a direct outcome of the separate streams of institutional accountability for the settings in which injury occurs.
Leadership for research integration must come from the research community. By joining forces the artificial (to science) boundaries of institutional separation will give way to syngergistic sharing of data and findings. Direct benefits to injury prevention will flow in the short term as findings from one area become applied to other areas. In the longer term the true dimensions of the injury problem will become more readily apparent as the myriad settings come to be seen as merely different manifestations of a problem at least as significant to population well being as heart disease and cancer.
INJURY RESEARCH FUNCTIONS AND NEEDS
The first, and probably the largest, hurdle to be overcome by researchers wishing to work across more than one field of injury research is the lack of integrated databases (and, in some specific areas, the sheer paucity of data).
The best within-application data bases are, not surprisingly, in the field of traffic injury 14 . In Victoria, for example:
• The Police compile standard crash report forms for all crashes in which a person is injured to a degree requiring medical treatment. This is the legally prescribed reporting criterion, however minor injuries, particularly those involving single bicyclists, motorcyclists or drivers are frequently not reported. Data from crashes involving severe injury, that is, requiring hospital admission or involving death appear to be comprehensive.
• A special unit within the Police investigates the most severe crashes in great detail and the Coroner undertakes inquests for fatal crashes. These data can provide insights for research hypotheses but are mostly used to mount legal cases against negligent persons and to exclude suicides from the 'routine' data base. 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7 1 9 8 8 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 • The Transport Accidents Commission maintains detailed medical details on injured victims as part of its charter to provide compensation. By merging the injury data with the routine Police data an invaluable tool exists for the understanding of injury mechanisms and the evaluation of injury amelioration measures.
• MUARC undertakes Level 2 in-depth studies to gather additional data from samples of crashes where the nature of the sampling frame can vary depending upon the issues of greatest interest at the time (see Figure 4) .
Fig. 4 A photo of a crash reconstruction in progress
The other two main areas of injury research are not as well served. For occupational injury the WorkCover Authority maintains a data base drawn from claims for compensation. It serves this purpose well but has serious shortcomings when one seeks to either formulate or test hypotheses related to prevention opportunities. The Coroner's database provides extensive detail in the case of data injuries but these are relatively few in an occupational setting. MUARC has completed a study for WorkCover advising how the database can be made more useful for injury research and prevention.
As a result of the paucity of data relating to other injury settings, MUARC created, with funding from Vic Health, the Victorian Injury Surveillance and Applied Research (VISAR) system 3 . Three separate databases are maintained:
• The National Coronial Information System under which data from coroners throughout Australia is pooled to provide data on all fatalities, no matter what the injury setting.
• A database of hospital admission where the cause was injury. All Victorian hospitals provide data using the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) injury coding protocols.
• A database using a standard coding form of injuries treated in a hospital emergency department. Some 28 hospitals in Victoria participate and it is estimated that about 80 per cent of cases so treated in the State are included in the database.
While the last two data bases provide a good indication of the nature and severity of the injury the data on "when", "where" and "what" caused it are problematic, particularly the information as to "cause". Hospitals are encouraged to use a free text field to indicate cause, for example "fell from trampoline" or "fell while riding in-line skates".
Parallel with the in-depth studies of motor vehicle crashes MUARC is conducting a case-based study of child injuries in falls from play-ground equipment and has also analysed the risk factors in the construction industry.
MUARC routinely analyses those databases and produces a quarterly publication 'Hazard' to convey the findings to health authorities and the general public 15 . While just scratching the surface of what is needed to underpin research, these data have proved effective in, for example:
• Leading to new standards for the construction of trampolines, • Promoting the case for child-proof containers for poisons and other hazardous substances, • Encouraging design changes in nursery furniture 16 , • Evaluating exercise programs as a fall prevention program for the elderly (see Figure 5 ). MUARC uses a simple, schematic model of the injury prevention research chain to guide the development of its research program at a strategic level ( Figure 6 ). Much has already been said about sector based weakness in injury data, and the importance of overcoming these cannot be over-stated. Measuring the extent of problems, identifying emerging trends and assessing relative risks are the fundamental building blocks for a scientific approach to injury prevention. While researchers are very innovative in undertaking special one-off data collections 17 there is no substitute for time series data that enables problems to be monitored.
Understanding causes -answering the "why" question -is also fundamental. One of the great tragedies of the current institutional separation of the major fields of injury prevention management is the lack of development of underpinning theory. Injury research is marked by its empiricism. This is very apparent in countermeasure evaluation where controversy often surrounds the outcome of studies 18 . Theories are needed, both to sharpen evaluation and to encourage cross-field applications .
There have been a few attempts at generating overarching theories, for example, the work on human risk-taking by Adams 19 . Unfortunately, the theory as formulated is not capable of critical test. Yet it has important implications which underline the sub-optimal nature of our current approaches to injury prevention. For example, Adam's theory posits that risk exposure control measures, such as those that discourage motorcycling in Australia (restricting people to low powered machines, banning pillion passengers, etc), will lead people to seek risk in other forms, perhaps in their recreational pursuits. With the current institutional arrangements we would not ever contemplate looking for adverse side-effects in areas outside the main area of interest to the research sponsoring authority.
A concentrated attempt at developing theory is unlikely to occur until injury research consolidates its efforts across all fields of application. A second essential element is the need for research to become more independent of the institutions responsible for injury prevention program management.
Much of the research in Australia is conducted in, or directly sponsored by, the road traffic authorities, the occupational safety authorities, and so on. This can lead to pressures on research designed to measure the effectiveness of interventions, especially where those interventions have strong institutional and political support 18 .
Finally, the development of countermeasures is constrained by the mindset characteristic of the given injury setting. Two examples will suffice to illustrate. First, the way in which education in schools is used to inculcate safe attitudes and behaviours. Quite separate programs exist for road safety education, alcohol and drug use education, sex education and so on, with each looking to its institutional sector for funding support. To the extent that Adams 19 work has validity, risk taking is a basic, human behaviour and, if 'shut off' in one environment will re-appear in another. A consolidated approach to risk-taking education in schools seems sensible.
Secondly, in traffic safety the value of continual improvements in vehicle safety, both primary and secondary, is well established. Unfortunately, however, design innovations take a long time to reach their full potential, of the order of a decade for a new design rule to pen- 
CONCLUSIONS
Injury is a major public health problem in most industrial and post-industrial societies but is not adequately recognised as such by government. This is the result of the fragmentation of institutional accountability for injury prevention management. Fragmentation is likely to continue because injury is, in effect, a by-product of its setting. For example, in road transport, injury is one of a number of adverse results of the primary task of managing the movement of people and goods.
As a consequence there is only a fledgling science of safety and very little underpinning theory. While institutional separation should remain for intervention management, the research effort should be integrated. In this way the science and the profession can develop and promote the value of the synergies across fields of application.
